| Shen Dao (c. 350-275 B. C.) influenced both
Daoism and Legalism. He was a native of Zhao who served at the
Jixia academy in Qi (an ancient center of philosophical debate).
A Han History lists him, along with Tian Pian, as having studied
Huang-Lao doctrines and Dao-de (Laozi¡¯s Dao-De Jing). The earliest
Daoist history (The Zhuangzi Ch. 33) lists him, along with Tian
Pian and Peng Meng, leading up to Laozi and Zhuangzi. Hanfeizi
credits him with originating the Legalist theory of shi (circumstance/power/charisma).
His own writings were presumably lost so we know of him primarily
through these indirect reports.
One Han source says he wrote a book of twelve chapters and
another lists a book under his name with forty-two chapters.
These seem to have disappeared by the Sung Dynasty when someone
assembled an apparently spurious book of fragments. Most scholars
are skeptical of its historical reliability but others still
debate the issue. We will rely only on the classical citations.
These, in any case, give the views of Shen Dao which philosophers
took as having influenced other developments in classical
Chinese thought.
Stoicism and the Great Tao
The Zhuangzi account characterizes Shen Dao and his associates,
Tian Pian and Peng Meng as "universal" rather than
"partial" and as lacking selfishness. These attitudes
justify placing them as a link between Mohism and Daoism.
It also separates Shen Dao from the alleged proto-Daoist Yang
Zhu, who was an Ethical egoist. The rest of the moral description,
however, makes them sound like ancient Roman Stoics. They
merely "flowed" with events without calculating
or choosing. The metaphysical description alleges that they
united all things and avoided dividing them into two.
They called the absolute one the "Great Dao" (way).
It embraced everything but had no distinctions within it.
It had both acceptable and unacceptable. My hypothesis is
that Shen Dao¡¯s innovation to contemporaneous moral thought
lay in denying the traditional view that nature was a moral
force--sort of. He makes his point somewhat puckishly--like
the libertine who claims God intends him to do whatever he
does. Shen Dao advocates following the actual dao--the actual
course of world history. He adds (truly enough) "Even
a clod of earth cannot miss the dao (guide).
Shen Dao¡¯s slogan was "abandon knowledge; discard self."
In the context of ancient Chinese philosophy, this was amoral
advice. Knowledge would have implied knowledge of some dao,
e.g., the traditional Confucian dao or the Mohist utilitarian
dao. To describe it as "knowledge" was to imply
that one had the correct dao and the shared assumption was
that their own dao was correct because it was natural (tian).
Let us call the course of action that results from learning
and applying a dao (guide) a performance dao. Each Classical
school advocated that we execute (i.e., make actual) a different
performance dao. Obviously, people disagreed about what was
the correct way to perform a dao just as they did about the
content of the instruction. Shen Dao, in effect, finessed
both questions by prescribing the actual dao. Surely the actual
dao is a natural one and any actual performance is a natural
one, so he can safely dispense with any further moral reflection
and theory.
How do we get the flavor of determinism from this stance?
While there areHoHow many rival prescriptive future world
histories, he notes there is only one actual past history
and there will be exactly one future history. Of the many
things you might do in the future, exactly one is what you
will do. The one actual world history is the Great Dao. This
invites us to conclude the future is now fixed, but the argument
is no stronger than the familiar tautology "what will
be will be."
"Follow the dao" now has the required consequences.
We do not need to study or learn, to make choices or distinctions.
Whatever we do, it will count as following the dao¡ªthe course
of nature. Thus, we can abandon even Yang Chu's egoism. For
all its shocking content, it too is a form of know-how¡ªa prescriptive
doctrine.
Therefore, the text tells us, Shen Dao:
. . . flowed with what couldn¡¯t be changed and was indifferent
to things." "He said: "Know to not know (what
to do)." He would have reduced know-how to something
harmful. Naked and without responsibility, he laughed at the
social world for elevating worthies. Dissolute and with no
standards of conduct, he rejected the social world's great
sages. Skillful and crafty he responded to natural kinds.
He lived together with shi and fei, mixed acceptable and avoidable.
He did not treat knowing and deliberation as guides, did not
know front from back. He was indifferent to everything. If
he was pushed he went, if pulled he followed--like a leaf
whirling in the stream, like a feather in a wind, like dust
on a millstone. He was complete and distinguished (fei) nothing.
In motion and rest never went too far. He was without crime.
How was this? Natural kinds that lack knowledge are free from
the trouble of creating a self and from the entanglements
of knowing what to do. In motion or rest, he did not miss
the natural tendencies. For this reason, he had no high status.
So he said, "reach for being like things without knowledge
of what to do. Do not use worthies and sages.
One notable difference from Roman Stoicism is that Shen Dao¡¯s
doctrine does not enjoin us to approve of or accept what happens.
Rather it suggests that we should make no judgment about it
at all. The Stoics, by contrast, because of their deterministic
conception of reason, concluded that, rationally, we should
approve of whatever happens. The concept of reason plays no
counterpart role in Shen Dao¡¯s view.
Political Implications
Assuming this interpretation, we can explain how Shen Dao's
ideas could have motivated the political insight Hanfeizi
claimed to have derived from him. Shen Dao¡¯s system challenged
the pre-philosophical Confucian doctrine of the mandate of
tian (heaven/nature) which put nature on the side of moral
virtue. Confucian legitimization required that the ruler hold
his position by virtue of his superior moral character and
wisdom. Shen Dao can be seen as rejecting the entrenched myth
of the mandate of heaven with the simple observation that
rulers become rulers because of circumstance, not because
of their moral worth or desert. It just happens! The Legalists,
unlike Shen Dao, found it interesting to reflect more on what
makes it happen.
Their study, however, is not of a moral dao, it is the study
of the actual circumstances that result in one¡¯s becoming
a ruler. The circumstances of power are subtler than sheer
coercion. There is a natural social tendency (noticed by Mozi)
to conform to those in higher position. The ruler relies on
this tendency¡ªwhether he deserves emulation or not. The ruler
is in his position because he rests on a hierarchy of authority
and the natural charisma of whoever is on the top more than
it does on moral qualities or even force.
As Hanfeizi develops Shen Dao¡¯s theory, it includes techniques
to enhance that natural charisma by elevating the throne,
requiring ritual kneeling, kowtowing, debasing forms of address
and severe punishment for looking directly into his face,
publicizing stories of his strength, accomplishment and skill.
Hanfeizi also ties it to Laozi¡¯s doctrine of taking "no
deliberate action." The ruler maintains his situational
authority by not expressing desires or decisions, by remaining
aloof and mysterious as he observes the process of official
decision making. How much of this elaboration stems from Shen
Dao we can only speculate. The important component of the
common contribution to Daoism and Legalism is the amoral portrayal
of nature and natural process.
Xunzi criticizes Shen Dao in ways that suggest he used the
concept of fa (standards) but the Hanfeizi account credits
this concept to another source, Shang Yang. However, the concept
itself was important to Mozi and could easily have been part
of Shen Dao¡¯s system. Possibly, he advocated the use of clear,
objective standards precisely because he doubted any moral
reality. This would explain Xunzi¡¯s criticism that "His
learning revered fa but he lacked fa." (Xunzi argued
that the fundamental fa could only be the judgment of a cultured
Confucian gentleman.) and that "blinded by the fa, he
lacked awareness of worthy human capacities." Xunzi¡¯s
third criticism, that Shen Dao had insight into following
but not leading, fits his stoicism but conflicts with the
fact that Hanfeizi credits him with a detailed theory of how
to maintain leadership. Xunzi's criticism may be a way of
disagreeing with the amoral theory of leadership. Claiming
he had none means no sound one. Alternatively, Hanfeizi may
have embellished Shen Dao's essentially negative theory with
some positive content.
The blending of metaphysical and political-moral theory itself
further recalls the Roman Stoics. Plausibly, Shen Dao and
his group would have endorsed continuing to participate in
government. If circumstances have so placed me, I will flow
along. This classic Stoic attitude offers a way to harmonize
moral alienation from a system seen as corrupt and the practical
imperative to work within it. Traces of it can be seen in
the school of Zhuangzi¡¯s later formulation of the famous "sage
within; king without" ideal of wu-wei (non-deliberate
action) action. One can responds to circumstances without
thinking they are right.
Taoist Influence and Paradox
The Zhuangzi account of Shen Dao, despite the seeming Daoist
orientation, is ultimately critical and dismissive. It declares
that his dao is for the dead, not the living. His dao was
not really a dao. We can easily interpret this censure in
the language of Laozi (whom the presentation treats as the
next step in the dialectic). This notion of the natural dao
does not tell us to do anything at all. It is a dao that can
not dao (guide) us.
Another way to make the same point is to focus on the slogan,
"abandon knowledge." The knowledge in question is
not factual representation (to which supposedly Shen Dao would
be favorable) but prescriptive guides. Thus, the slogan amounts
to the prescription "do not follow prescriptive guides."
This generates a prescriptive paradox. If you follow it, you
disobey it. If you ignore it, you follow it. It is a dao that
can not dao.
We see here perhaps the beginnings of the Daoist interest
in paradox. The Zhuangzi account suggests that Laozi took
something valuable from Shen Dao. Most plausibly, it is his
anti-knowledge, anti-sage attitude. In The Laozi, we get almost
no hint of logical determinism. He recommends abandoning knowledge
on the quite different grounds that conforming to social systems
of knowledge deprives us of natural freedom and spontaneity.
His broadens his analysis of knowledge to include the knowledge
implicit merely in the names and distinctions we use to construct
guiding theories. This would have been the other route of
influence from Shen Dao.
Zhuangzi also arguably draws some inspiration from Shen Dao
although he notes the incoherence of an "all is one"
metaphysics. The insight that an appeal to nature gives no
guidance is crucial to Zhuangzi¡¯s mature Daoism.
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